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I. Introduction
On June 22, 2000, a bombshell was dropped on several Caribbean nations. The
Financial Action Task Force (hereinafter FATF) in its Review to Identify Non-cooperative
Countries or Territories (hereinafter Review 2000) identified "serious systemic problems"
with the anti-money laundering laws in five Caribbean nations.' The FATF recommended
that financial institutions in its member nations give "special attention" to transactions
involving these five "non-cooperative countries."'2 One year later, the FATF issued a
new list of non-cooperative countries (hereinafter Review 2001), with two of the five
Caribbean nations no longer labeled as non-cooperative.3
The FATF's blacklist, and the responses of the Caribbean nations to their inclusion
on the blacklist, illustrate that the international fight against money laundering is likely
to result in a split among jurisdictions with the major financial centers of the Caribbean
quickly adopting laws that conform with the demands of the international community in
an effort to maintain their position within the financial community. The less significant
financial centers among the Caribbean nations may move more slowly in response to
1. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), Review to Identify Non-cooperative
Countries or Territories: Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Mea-
sures 12, 64 (June 22, 2000), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdffNCCT2000-en.pdf
[hereinafter FATF, Review 2000].
2. Id. at 12, 1 65.
3. FATF, Review to Identify Non-cooperative Countries or Territories: Increasing the Worldwide
Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures 3, 1 (June 22, 2001), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/NCCT2001len.pdf [hereinafter FATF, Review 2001].
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international demands, as they may view the benefits of compliance as either minimal
or even negative.
The first section of this comment will address the criminal need for money launder-
ing, and the processes by which money is laundered. Section II will discuss the attrac-
tiveness of the financial centers of the Caribbean for a wide range of financial services
including money laundering. The third section addresses the FATF, the major organiza-
tion involved in the fight against money laundering worldwide. The fourth section will
discuss the FATF's reviews of the five Caribbean jurisdictions, and their responses to the
FATF's demands, with special emphasis placed on the responses of the Bahamas and the
Cayman Islands, both of which won removal from the FATF's list of non-cooperative
countries in 2001. I conclude with thoughts as to the problems of compliance with the
FATF, and the likely direction the fight against money laundering is to take in the wake
of the terrorist attacks on the United States, and the problems that offshore financial
centers face.
II. The Fruits of Crime and the Necessity
of Money Laundering
The objective of many criminal acts is to create a profit for the individual criminal
or criminal group that committed the illegal act.4 The larger the profits generated, the
greater the need for the criminal to find a way to control the funds without bringing
notice to the manner in which they were earned.5 Without money laundering operations
to bestow an appearance of legitimacy upon in-gotten profits, the profits generated would
betray the fact that they were produced by crime.6 As a result, "[m]oney laundering is
the life blood of the drug syndicate and traditional organised crime" 7
A. WASHING UP: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS OF MONEY LAUNDERING
The money laundering process is commonly thought of as occurring in three phases:
placement, layering, and integration! In the placement phase, the money laundering
process introduces the proceeds of criminal activity, usually large amounts of cash, into
the financial system in a manner that seeks to prevent the monies from being identified
as the proceeds of crime.9 Placement can be accomplished by any number of methods; 0
however, the end result of the placement process is often a deposit at a financial institu-
tion." Placement is followed by layering, which involves attempts to hide the paper trail
4. FATF, Policy Brief Money Laundering 1 (July 1999), available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/pdfl
PB9906en.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2002) [hereinafter FATF, Policy Brief].
5. See Guy STESSENS, MONEY LAUNDERING: A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT MODEL
8 (2000).
6. See id.
7. Id. (quoting former American Attorney-General Edwin A. Meese).
8. WILLIAM C. GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY: THE EVOLUTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING COUNTER-
MEASURES 29 (Council of Europe Publishing 2d ed. 1999).
9. Bruce Zagaris, A Brave New World: Recent Developments in Anti-Money Laundering and
Related Litigation Traps for the Unwary in International Trust Matters, 32 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1023, 1027 (1999).
10. See FATF, Policy Brief, supra note 4, at 2.
11. STESSENS, supra note 5, at 84.
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that can betray the criminal source or ownership of the funds by carrying out various
transactions. 2 The final phase of the process integrates the money into the legitimate
economy and gives it the appearance of legitimacy,13 which allows it to be used for legal
purposes without attracting the attention of law enforcement authorities. 14
While the process of money laundering is conceptually broken into three stages,
the methods by which money is laundered are varied and numerous. 5 Though numer-
ous, all money laundering techniques share common features to satisfy the launderers'
requirements. 6 The money launderers seek to conceal the ownership and source of their
funds, maintain control of the funds, and change the form of the funds to enable their
use elsewhere.' 7
B. SEEKING TO STEM THE TIDE OF MONEY LAUNDERING
Considering the money launderers' requirements and the three-step process of laun-
dering, authorities sought to determine the points in the system where the launderer
would be most susceptible to detection." As drug trafficking was the impetus behind
the first international efforts to combat money laundering, and given that the proceeds
drug traffickers seek to launder are usually in the form of large volumes of cash, it was
natural that law enforcement authorities would first turn to the placement stage. 19
Because of the need to convert cash into forms that are less susceptible to detec-
tion, the primary focus of anti-money laundering efforts has been on the procedures
that deposit-taking institutions use.2" "[I]t has become common practice to impose sig-
nificant obligations on banks, building societies and other deposit-taking institutions in
the fight against money laundering.' 2' This has resulted in requirements for customer
identification, record-keeping, and reporting suspicious transactions, to name just a few
of the methods used in an attempt to create a paper trail for law enforcement authorities
to follow. It has also increased the likelihood that authorities would be able to discover
the criminal nature of the proceeds at the placement stage.22 As a result of encountering
12. Id.
13. id.
14. Julie Fendo, Attacking the Tools of Corruption: The Foreign Money Laundering Deterrence and
Anti-Corruption Act of 1999, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1540, 1544 (2000).




19. Id. Money launderers face an additional source of vulnerability before placement. Criminal
proceeds held as cash rather than as an account in a financial institution are susceptible
to the normal risks of cash, as well as being discoverable by authorities by less advanced
means than those contemplated by the FATF. "Customs agents using money-sniffing dogs
have begun regularly inspecting passengers and luggage" resulting in seizures of as much as
$1.1 million in cash in a single instance. Tod Robberson, Investigators Hope Money Trail is
Path to Stopping Drug Flow: Unlikely Helpers Aid Effort against Complex Global Transactions,
DALLAS MORNING NEws, Oct. 21, 2001, at IA.




more stringent standards in general, launderers naturally sought out those jurisdictions
where a lesser degree of regulation made placement of their illegal proceeds into the
financial system easier.
23
"Money laundering is not simply a problem faced by the banking community
and other mainstream financial institutions:'24 Increasingly, money launderers are using
non-financial businesses for their purposes. 2 5 While launderers often acquire and cor-
rupt actual, on-going businesses to this purpose, they are also able to create fictitious
businesses to accomplish their goals. 26 Offshore financial centers, which offer high lev-
els of banking and commercial secrecy, relatively low tax rates, a large financial sector,
modern telecommunication capabilities, and no currency controls on deposits of foreign
currencies, are popular jurisdictions to establish these fictitious businesses for money
laundering purposes.27
III. The Particular Attractiveness of Caribbean
Financial Centers
Law enforcement authorities and money laundering experts have long identified the
countries of the Caribbean basin as areas of particular concern in the fight against money
laundering.28 The Caribbean nations have been popular destinations for drug dollars
because of their "proximity to the United States, high levels of corruption, and.., many
financial centers with secrecy laws and lenient taxes:'29
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFSHORE SECTOR IN THE CARIBBEAN
Many of the Caribbean nations began to develop as offshore financial secrecy and tax
havens to promote their economic diversification in an attempt to address the problems
of an inadequate natural resource base and declining agricultural viability.30 A number
of factors encouraged this drive for diversification: the remoteness and insularity of
the Caribbean nations, small populations which lead to higher per person costs for
governmental institutions, a reliance on external trade and foreign investment leaving
them susceptible to external shocks, susceptibility to natural disasters, and a narrow
resource base.3'
23. Id. at 32.
24. Id. at 36.
25. Id. at 36-37.
26. Id. at 37.
27. Id. at 37-38.
28. Id. at 185.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Small States:
Meeting Challenges in the Global Economy 5 (April 2000), available at http://wblnOO18.world-
bank.org/ html/ smallstates.nsf / (SmaUStateslookup 1) /WorkProgramsWorkPrograms ? Open
Document (last visited Aug. 13, 2002).
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Establishing themselves as offshore financial centers allows the Caribbean nations to
"attract funds, provide jobs and facilitate economic development' 3 The diversification
into financial services has had remarkable results. The Cayman Islands in 1964 had two
banks and no offshore businesses; today the Cayman Islands are the world's fifth most
significant financial center." The Bahamas, Aruba, and the Netherlands Antilles are also
major financial centers.34
B. THE LEGITIMATE USES OF OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS
While the offshore financial centers have attracted a great deal of attention for their
role in money laundering, they offer many important, legitimate uses as well. Indeed, in
1997 offshore centers made up one half of the world's twelve largest banking centers.35
An important element of many offshore centers is their secrecy laws. Banking secrecy
has a long history and is an important consideration for both corporate and individual
customers.36 "Withholding financial information from competitors, suppliers, creditors
and customers, is a right that business people assume from the outset.. ., confidentiality
and the judicious use of information is generally assumed in business as a critical compo-
nent of rules of the game in market-oriented economies. "'37 This use of offshore financial
and bank secrecy jurisdictions is part of a legitimate effort on the part of companies to
maintain their privacy and a competitive edge in an increasingly competitive business
environment "in which competitive intelligence has become almost mandatory."3
Private citizens also benefit from the personal banking confidentiality protected as a
key right for citizens in liberal democracies through a wide range of civil and criminal
laws. 9 Offshore centers can also offer trusts that provide the opportunity to avoid forced
32. Jack A. Blum et al., Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Launderin, CRIME PREVEN-
TION & CRIMINAL JUSTICE NEWSLETTER (United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime
Prevention)g (New York, NY, 1998), available at http://www.imolin. org/finhaeng.htm (last
visited Mar. 10, 2002).
33. GILMORE, supra note 8, at 185.
34. Id. Indeed, the success of the offshore sector in the Caribbean has inspired a number of
imitators. Not all offshore banks are literally "offshore.' Legislators and executives in Colorado
and Montana are in the process of establishing offshore banks that would be subject to
less regulation than local banks, and to an annual fee on deposits that would go to the
state treasuries. Banking secrecy that troubles U.S. officials abroad is a key feature of these
efforts. Montana has instituted penalties of a $10,000 fine and 10 years of imprisonment for
knowingly disclosing financial information about a depositor in an "offshore" bank in the
state. While not yet a race to the bottom in regulatory standards, the competitive pressures
that affect Caribbean offshore centers are already evident in Colorado and Montana as they
compete with one another by lowering the fees they charge on deposits. Paul Beckett &
Russell Gold, Switzerland in Rockies: Offihore Banking Arrives in U.S. with Some of its Baggage,
WALL ST. J., June 6, 2001, at Cl, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2865676.
35. ANTHONY GINSBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAX HAVENS 4 (2nd ed. 1997).
36. Blum et al., supra note 32.
37. Id. (quoting WALTER INGO SECRET MONEY 2 (Lexington, Massachusetts, D.C. Heath, 1985)).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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heirship laws, more common in civil law jurisdictions that would dictate the distribution
of assets from a parent's estate "regardless of the parents' wishes or better judgment:'40
Offshore centers usually offer low or nonexistent tax rates that attract investors and
company owners seeking to reduce their tax burdens, as well as ordinary citizens."' These
centers attract deposits both from citizens who seek to avoid taxes through legitimate
uses of loopholes, and those who evade taxes by concealing their wealth.42
Offshore centers offer important benefits to onshore financial centers as well.
Onshore banks seek to establish operations in offshore centers to avoid Federal Reserve
requirements that obligate banks to place a percentage of their deposits in reserve
accounts nightly that earn no interest.43 Through the creation of an overseas branch in
an offshore center, onshore banks can create profit centers not available within their
home jurisdiction." Offshore centers can attract hedge funds by offering more flexible
regulations that may allow more leverage or investment in one type of asset than would
be allowed under American regulations.4 1 Many Caribbean centers also provide for the
creation of International Business Companies (IBCs), relatively informal organizations
that have numerous legitimate uses, including the holding of patents, utilization of tax
treaties, and foreign trade.' Despite the numerous legitimate uses of offshore financial
centers, it is their susceptibility to use for money laundering that necessitates the
attention paid to them by anti-money laundering authorities.
IV. The Financial Action Task Force
The single most important international body in the fight against money laundering
is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 47 The G-7 Summit in Paris in 1989 established
the FATF in response to growing concerns over the problem of money laundering.48
The FATF is an intergovernmental body composed of 29 countries and two international
organizations.49 While housed within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
40. See GINSBERG, supra note 35, at 228.




45. GINSBERG, supra note 35, at 78-79.
46. Blum et al., supra note 32.
47. Giu soR, supra note 8, at 79.
48. FATF, Policy Brief, supra note 4, at 1.
49. The twenty-nine member countries of the FATF are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, China, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. The two member international organizations are the European Com-
mission and the Gulf Cooperation Council. FATF, The Forty Recommendations 1, available
at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/4oRec-en.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2002) [hereinafter FATF,
Recommendations].
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Development, the FATF is not formally a part of any other international organization."0
In fact, the FATF is neither a permanent international organization, nor a body charged
with managing a legally binding convention; the FATF is an ad-hoc group with a singular
agenda."' The sole purpose of the FATF is "the development and promotion of policies
to combat money laundering."52
The FATF is a multi-disciplinary body "bringing together the policy-making power
of legal, financial and law enforcement experts:' s The three duties of the FATF in its
campaign against money laundering are: to monitor its member nations' progress in
putting into operation anti-money laundering measures; to follow "advancements" in
money laundering techniques and suggest measures to combat them; and to promote
"the adoption and implementation of FATF anti-money laundering standards globally."'
The FATF was certainly successful in its goal of seeking to develop a set of stan-
dards for combating money laundering. First drafted in 1990, and revised in 1996,
the FATF developed "The Forty Recommendations" that set out a basic blueprint for
anti-money laundering efforts."s The Recommendations serve as principles to be imple-
mented with flexibility by countries according to the circumstances of their financial and
legal systems.5 6 The Forty Recommendations cover law enforcement and the criminal
justice system, the financial system and its regulation, and standards for international
cooperation.5 7
A. THE PROBLEM OF NON-COOPERATIVE NATIONS
In its fight against money laundering, it was apparent to the FATF that as its mem-
bers strengthened their systems to combat money laundering in response to the Forty
Recommendations, criminals would move their money laundering operations to other
jurisdictions with less stringent regulations."8 Indeed, the FATF felt that each success in
bringing one nation into compliance with its standards would result in a "race to the
bottom" between other jurisdictions, exacerbating competition between financial centers,
50. Gmomz, supra note 8, at 82.
51. Id. While the unique make-up of the FATF raises questions about its de jure rights to pre-
scribe international standards applicable to non-member countries and to impose sanctions
for the breach of those standards, the de facto power of the FATF is real as evidenced by the
efforts made by the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands as discussed in this comment to com-
ply with the FATF's standards. For an interesting discussion of the questions of sovereignty in
relation to the FATF and similar multilateral initiatives see Benjamin R. Hartman, Coercing
Cooperation flor Offshore Financial Centers: Identity and Coincidence of International Obli-
gations against Money Laundering and Harmful Tax Competition, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 253 (2001).
52. See FATF, Recommendations, supra note 49, at 1.
53. Id.
54. FATF, Policy Brief, supra note 4, at 4.
55. See FATF, Recommendations, supra note 49, at 1.
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. FATF, Review 2001, supra note 3, at 5, 6.
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and contributing to a worsening of existing practices.59 As a result, the FATF has engaged
in significant efforts "to identify key anti-money laundering weaknesses in jurisdictions
both inside and outside its membership."6° "The goal of the FATF's work in this area
is to secure the adoption by all financial centres of international standards to prevent,
detect and punish money laundering" 6
B. TWENTY-FIVE CRITERIA DEFINING A NON-COOPERATIVE NATION
As part of the FATF's goal to have all financial centers adopt its standards against
money laundering, the FATF published a report on February 14, 2000 on the issue of
non-cooperative countries and territories in the fight against money laundering.62 This
report set out twenty-five detrimental rules and practices that obstruct international
cooperation against money laundering.63 While separate from the Forty Recommen-
dations, the twenty-five criteria are consistent with the Forty Recommendations."
These twenty-five detrimental rules and practices served as the guide for defining non-
cooperative countries and territories in the FATF's annual reviews in 2000 and 2001.65
The twenty-five criteria are broken into four broad categories: loopholes in financial
regulations, obstacles raised by other regulatory requirements, obstacles to international
cooperation, and inadequate resources for preventing and detecting money laundering
activities.66
1. Loopholes in Financial Regulations
The largest of the four basic categories (encompassing eleven of the twenty-five
criteria)67 addresses the loopholes in financial regulations. The identified loopholes in
financial regulations include inadequate regulations and supervision of financial institu-
tions, inadequate rules for licensing and creation of financial institutions including back-
ground checks on financial managers, inadequate know-your-customer requirements,
excessive secrecy provisions, and the lack of efficient systems for reporting suspicious
transactions. 68 Know-your-customer requirements for financial institutions are of obvi-
ous importance in the fight against money laundering when one considers the basic
desire of criminal launderers to keep both their criminal identity and criminal nature of
their funds hidden.69
59. See FATF, Report on Non-cooperative Countries and Territories 1, 2 (Feb. 14, 2000), available
at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/NCCT-en.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2002) [hereinafter FATF,
Report on Non-cooperative Countries].
60. FATF, Review 2001, supra note 3, at 5, 1 7.
61. Id. at 5, $ 9.
62. See FATF, Report on Non-cooperative Countries, supra note 59, at 1, 3-4.
63. Id. at 1, 1 7.
64. Id. at 1, 4.
65. See FATF, Review 2000, supra note 1, at 2, s 9; See FATF, Review 2001, supra note 3, at 7,
1 18.
66. FATF, Report on Non-cooperative Countries, supra note 59, at 2, $ 8.
67. Id. at 2-4, 11 9-18.
68. Id.
69. See GILMORE, supra note 8, at 30.
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2. Regulatory Obstacles
The second broad category concerns obstacles raised by other regulatory require-
ments, including: inadequate commercial law requirements for registering business and
legal entities and lack of identification of beneficial owners.70 These criteria again address
the concerns about financial institutions not knowing their customers and the lack of
know-your-customer requirements in non-cooperative countries.
3. Obstacles to International Cooperation
The category regarding obstacles to international co-operation addresses the inher-
ent multilateral nature of the fight against money laundering. The criteria included here
address both administrative and judicial obstacles to cooperation, The administrative
obstacles identified as criteria to define a country as non-cooperative include prohibitions
or restrictions on the exchange of information between anti-money laundering authori-
ties, and even an obvious unwillingness to cooperate.7 Judicial obstacles include a failure
to criminalize laundering the proceeds of serious crimes and the existence of laws that
prohibit or unduly restrict the exchange of information between judicial authorities."
4. Inadequate Resources Devoted to Fighting Money Laundering
The final category makes inadequate resources for preventing and detecting money
laundering one of the criteria for defining a country as non-cooperative.' 4 Poorly trained
or corrupt staff among those responsible for anti-money laundering compliance is a cri-
terion for non-cooperation. The twenty-fifth criterion is the lack of a centralized financial
intelligence unit to collect, analyze, and disseminate relevant information concerning
suspicious transactions to the proper authorities."
C. AFTER SEPTEMBER 11: A NEW ENVIRONMENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
Like so much of the rest of the world, offshore financial centers changed on
September 11, 2001. While there has been no formal change to the twenty-five detri-
mental rules and practices, the FATF has adopted new standards to incorporate the
crackdown on terrorist financing.76 The FATF has added eight new recommendations
70. FATF, Report on Non-cooperative Countries, supra note 59, at 4, 11 19-22.
71. Id. at 4-5, lI 23-31.
72. Id. at 4-5, 24-26.
73. Id. at 5, I 28-29.
74. Id. at 5-6, 32-34.
75. Id. at 6, 1 34.
76. FATF, FATF Cracks Down on Terrorist Financing 3, Oct. 31, 2001, available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pdf/PR-20011031-en.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2002) [hereinafter FATF, Crack Down].
Cracking down on money laundering in relation to terrorist activities is made more difficult
by the differing needs of terrorist financing and drug-related money laundering. The amounts
involved in financing the attacks of September 11, 2001 pale in comparison to the amount of
money involved in drug trafficking; and the terrorists were able to succeed, in part, because
authorities were focused on drug-related targets. Antonio Fins, Terrorists' Cash Flows in Secret
World, S.FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 30, 2001, at 1H, available at 2001 WL 22758419.
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with regard to terrorist financing to The Forty Recommendations. The new recommen-
dations are: 1) that immediate steps be taken to ratify and implement the 1999 United
Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;
2) each country should criminalize financing terrorism, terrorist acts, and terrorist
organizations and ensure that those offenses constitute money laundering predicate
offenses; 3) each country should adopt and implement measures to freeze and seize
the assets of terrorists; 4) require reporting of funds that are suspected to be linked to
terrorism; 5) each country should afford others the greatest cooperation in connection
with inquiries relating to terrorism and its financing; 6) application of all FATF recom-
mendations to informal money transfer systems; 7) enhanced scrutiny of the originators
of wire transfers; and 8) countries should review the adequacy of regulations that relate
to non-profit entities that may be abused for terrorist activities.'
Britain has said that "the FATF should 'name and shame' countries that do not
implement measures to deprive terrorists of financing."78 As part of the plan adopted by
the FATF at the meeting on the financing of terrorism in October 2001, the FATF plans
to initiate a process "to identify jurisdictions that lack appropriate measures to combat
terrorist financing' much like the current review to identify non-cooperative countries. 79
A failure to adopt the new recommendations regarding terrorist financing is likely to
assure a nation of being labeled non-cooperative. The urgency of the crackdown means
that the repercussions of being labeled non-cooperative will increase, as the United States
is likely to view any derogation from these standards as grounds for economic sanctions
with the potential of inflicting serious harm on the financial sector of non-cooperative
nations.
D. WHY WHEN THE FATF SPEAKS SOME NATIONS HAVE TO LISTEN
The FATF's list of non-cooperating countries is a "name and shame" list with a
bite. The FATF's report that set out the twenty-five criteria for defining non-cooperative
countries also set out certain actions designed "to put an end to the detrimental rules and
practices"80 of non-cooperative countries that FATF member countries should consider
taking when dealing with non-cooperative countries "to protect their economies and
financial systems against criminal money.'8'
77. FATF, Crack Down, supra note 76, at 3-4. The call for the application of all FATF recommen-
dations to informal money transfer systems is prompted by the use of "hawala" networks
common in the Middle East which are an informal system used to transfer money based on
an honor-code. Because "hawala operates under the radar of financial regulators" the efforts
necessary to combat money laundering through these systems will be different than those
previously advocated by the FATF. See Fins, supra note 76, at 1H.
78. Andrew Parker, Attack on Afghanistan Diplomacy & Terrorist Finances, FIN. TiMES, Oct. 29,
2001, available at 2001 WL 29306008.
79. FATF, Crack Down, supra note 76, at 2.
80. FATF, Report on Non-cooperative Countries, supra note 59, at 7.
81. Id. at 8.
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1. Putting an End to Detrimental Practices
The first step the FATF report discusses to put an end to detrimental rules and
practices is a dialogue with the non-cooperative country that "should prompt them to
amend their laws and change their practices.' The report then suggests that multilateral
organizations could take specific actions to seek appropriate action on the part of the
non-cooperative country."3 The report also suggests that the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund in particular could view a failure to follow the recommendation
of the FATF as a reason not to undertake activities within the jurisdiction.8
The report suggests the final action be the application of Recommendation 21 to
countries unwilling to take constructive action."s Recommendation 21 of the FATF's
"Forty Recommendations" provides that "[flinancial institutions should give special
attention to business relations and transactions" from countries which do not sufficiently
apply the Forty Recommendations. 6 "Whenever these transactions have no apparent
economic or visible lawful purpose" the background of the transactions should be inves-
tigated as best as possible and any finding should be kept in writing "to help supervisors,
auditors and law enforcement agencies:'87 While "special attention" is not defined fur-
ther, adding time and expense to every transaction emanating from a given country is
an obvious incentive not to do business in that country.
2. Protecting Economies from Money Laundering
in Non-cooperative Nations
Apart from actions designed to put an end to detrimental practices, the report
also listed counter-measures that FATF members might take to protect their economies
from money laundering in non-cooperative nations. 8 The report provides that indi-
vidual FATF members are free to implement the counter-measures on an independent
basis, but suggests that they "should be applied according to the gravity of the identi-
fied deficiencies" within the non-cooperative nation.8 9 The first and second categories
of counter-measures provide for strict know-your-customer requirements when finan-
cial institutions within FATF members do business for or with individuals or entities
within non-cooperative jurisdictions, and for mandatory reporting of all transactions
with non-cooperative jurisdictions.90 The final suggested counter-measure provides that
FATF members should consider "whether it is desirable and feasible to condition, restrict,
target or even prohibit financial transactions" with non-cooperative countries."
82. Id. at 7, 1 46.
83. Id. at 7, 47.
84. See id. at 7, 1 47.
85. Id. at 8, 48.
86. FATF, Recommendations, supra note 49, at 5, 21.
87. Id.
88. FATF, Report on Non-cooperative Countries, supra note 59, at 8.
89. Id. at 8, 1 50.
90. Id. at 8, 51-53.
91. Id. at 8, 1 54 (emphasis added).
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3. The Costs of Non-cooperation
Even absent the application of any specific counter-measures, being labeled as a
non-cooperative nation can carry real costs. The ECONOMIST notes that in 1999, "Antigua
suffered a financial drought after America and Britain issued an 'advisory' to their
financial institutions, recommending 'enhanced scrutiny' for transactions there' 92 When
Liechtenstein was put on the list of non-cooperative countries in 2000, Standard and
Poor's changed the outlook for Liechtenstein's (admittedly not Caribbean) biggest bank
from stable to negative, citing worries about the effect anti-money laundering counter-
measures might have on the bank's business." Before the release of the FATF's Review
2001, Standard and Poor's raised its outlook for the bank in anticipation that the prin-
cipality would not be on the 2001 list.94 Smaller nations with relatively large financial
sectors, Such as Liechtenstein and many Caribbean nations, are naturally both more
dependent on their financial industry and less able to bear any costs of non-cooperation.
Therefore, they must view the FATF's reviews with some trepidation.
E. THE CARIBBEAN FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE
The FATF is not the only multilateral institution involved in combating money
laundering in the Caribbean. Leaders from the countries of the Caribbean and Central
America met in Aruba in June 1990 and established the Caribbean Financial Action Task
Force (CFATF). 9s The members of the CFATF are determined to "defeat the evils of drug
trafficking and money laundering:' 96 As part of their efforts against money launder-
ing, the CFATF "agreed to endorse and implement both the 40 FATF recommendations
and 19 Aruba recommendations."97 The nineteen Aruba recommendations created by
the CFATF are intended to address specific money laundering issues that occur in the
Caribbean.9 s
The CFATF is headed by a Council of Ministers (the Council)99 that is the supreme
authority within the CFATF. ° The Memorandum of Understanding that governs the
92. All Havens in a Storm, ECONOMIST, July 1, 2001, available at 2000 WL 8142669.
93. Fighting the Dirt, ECONOMIST, June 23, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7319487.
94. Id.
95. GILMORE, supra note 8, at 186. The members of the CFATF include: Anguilla, Antigua and
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherland Antilles,
Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, and Venezuela. Though the names would
seem to indicate a relation, the CFATF is not a member of the FATE See FATF, Recommen-
dations, supra note 49, at 1.
96. CFATF, Kingston Declaration on Money Laundering 8, 20 (Nov. 5-6, 1992), available at
http://www.cfatforg/eng/.
97. Id. at 2, 5.
98. GILMORE, supra note 8, at 186.
99. CFATF, Memorandum of Understanding Among Member Governments of the Caribbean Finan-
cial Action Task Force, art. VI(i) (Oct. 10, 1996), available at http://www.cfatf.orgleng/.
100. Id. art. VII(I).
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CFATF may be amended by a unanimous vote of the Council.1"' The Council's functions
include the adoption of mutual evaluation reports on members,'0 2 adoption of revised
Recommendations," 3 and the power to take appropriate actions with respect to members
that fail to comply with the CFATF's standards.'
°4
The members of the CFATF engage in both self-assessment exercises and mutual
evaluations to monitor and encourage their progress in implementing policies against
money laundering." 5 The mutual evaluation program is "a crucial aspect of the work of
the CFATF" because it is one of the primary methods by which the CFATF ensures that
its members comply with its standards. °6 The mutual evaluations are not a judgment
by one nation, but "a constructive consultative dialogue between professionals, be they
bank supervisors/regulators [or] legal officers."' 7 The aim of the evaluation process
is to assist a nation in improving its anti-money laundering law rather than just to
castigate it for its failures.' Comparing the mutual evaluation by professionals from
peer countries with a unilateral evaluation process draws out several distinct points of
difference. The mutual evaluation procedure is a multilateral, private evaluation process
that relies on cooperation among countries to promote progress, compared to the public
"name and shame" nature of the FATF's list of non-cooperative nations that relies on
punitive measures to coerce compliance.'" Nevertheless, it is the FATF, not the CFATF,
to which the industrialized nations belong. Thus, it is the FATF's methods that are given
more effect.
V. The Five Non-cooperative Caribbean Nations
The FATF's Review 2000 labeled five Caribbean jurisdictions as non-cooperative:
Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines."' Of these countries only the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands made suf-
ficient progress in addressing the deficiencies identified by the FATF in the following
year to warrant removal from the list of non-cooperative countries in the FATF's Review
2001." The steps taken by the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands to comply with the
FATF's requirements are the main subjects of this section; the less successful efforts of
the other three nations are discussed afterwards.
101. Id art. XIX.
102. Id art. VII(4)(vii).
103. Id art. VII(4)(viii).
104. Id art. VII(4)(x).
105. See id. arts. XIV, XV; see also GILMORE, supra note 8, at 187.
106. Calvin Wilson, The Mutual Evaluation Process of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force,
15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 759, 805 (2000).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Victoria H. Figge, Best Practices in Multilateral Implementation, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. Rtv.
759, 808 (2000).
110. FATF, Review 2000, supra note 1, at 12 64.
111. FATF, Review 2001, supra note 3, at 3 1.
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A. THE BAHAMAS
The Bahamas's status as an offshore center has had significant beneficial effects for
the island's economy. Prime Minister Hubert Ingraham has stated that:
Our success in services over the past thirty or more years has permitted us to enjoy the third
highest per capita income among independent states in the Western hemisphere, following
only the United States and Canada. Today, we can boast of higher levels of employment,
increased home ownership, rising personal and household income, the lowest business loan
interest rates in thirty years and of increased entrepreneurial opportunities and small business
growth. Together, these permit and support our infrastructural and social agenda.'
In spite of, or perhaps because of, their dependence on the financial sector, the
Bahamas has been at the forefront of the battle against money laundering. When the
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances first established money laundering as a criminal offense in 1988,10 the
Bahamas was the first country to ratify the convention." 4 Furthermore, before the FATF's
Review 2000, the Bahamas already had its own anti-money laundering law in The Money
Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act, 1995.
Nevertheless, though the FATF acknowledged that the Bahamas had "comprehensive
anti-money laundering legislation' they still identified deficiencies within the Bahamas's
system that merited the inclusion of the Bahamas on the list of non-cooperative coun-
tries in the Review 2000." s In the FATF's Review 2000, the Bahamas was deemed to be
in compliance fully with ten of the twenty-five criteria set by the FATF, and partly in
compliance with a further four of the criteria." 6 The FATF found fault with a lack of
information about the beneficial ownership of trusts and IBCs, particularly the ability
to issue bearer shares." 7 The Bahamas also allowed certain intermediaries (for exam-
ple, attorneys) to invoke their professional codes to avoid revealing the identity of their
clients." 8 The FATF further expressed frustration with the degree and nature of interna-
tional cooperation with anti-money laundering authorities in the Bahamas. Long delays,
restricted responses to requests for assistance, and no allowances for cooperation outside
of judicial channels were hallmarks of the process of international cooperation in the
Bahamas." 9
112. Jeremy Hetherington-Gore, The Bahamas-Virtue Rewarded, at http://www.lowtax.net/
html/jcaspec.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2002).
113. Blum et al., supra note 32.
114. Peter D. Maynard, The Law Against Corruption and Money Laundering in the Caribbean with
Special Reference to the Bahamas, 29 U. MIAMI INTER-Am L. REv. 627, 634 (1998).
115. FATF, Review 2000, supra note 1, at 2-3 12. The FATF has not yet completed an assess-
ment of its members against the 25 criteria used to define non-cooperative countries.
FATF, Annual Report 2001-2002, at 20, 96 (June 22, 2002), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pdf/AR2002-en.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2002). For the sake of comparison, the
United States is in full compliance with 17 of the FATF's Forty Recommendation, and is in
partial compliance with a further 10 of the Forty Recommendations. Id. Annex C.
116. Id. at 3, 12.
117. Id. at 3, 112.
118. Id. at 3, 12.
119. Id.
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Just twelve months later, in the FATF's Review 2001, the FATF removed the Bahamas
from its list of non-cooperative countries.'20 The FATF observed that the Bahamas made
progress in implementing its- counter-money laundering regime by adopting laws that
addressed "banking supervision, customer identification, information about ownership
of IBCs and channels for providing international cooperation at the judicial level as well
as the administrative level through the new FIU (financial intelligence unit)." "' In the
twelve-month span from June 22, 2000 to June 22, 2001, the Bahamas had enacted new
laws that amounted to "a complete overhaul of most of the Bahamas' main financial
services legislation
" 122
1. Proceeds of Crime Act, 2000
The Proceeds of Crime Act, 2000 expanded the definition of the offense of money
laundering in the Bahamas compared to the Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act,
1995. The 1995 Act made money laundering an offense only if a person knew that the
proceeds were criminal in nature. 3 The new act makes money laundering an offense
for any person who knows, suspects, or has reasonable grounds to suspect the criminal
nature of the proceeds.12 4 A person is guilty of money laundering if they act with the
intent to conceal or disguise the "nature, source, location, disposition, movement or
ownership" of the proceeds of criminal conduct."S
Furthermore, the act creates a positive duty to disclose information gained during
the course of employment that leads a person to know, suspect, or have reason to suspect
that another person is engaged in money laundering. 6 Failure to disclose the required
information can result in imprisonment for three to ten years, or fines from $50,000 to
an unlimited amount, or both fines and imprisonment 2 7 The act maintains legal pro-
fessional privileges,12 but also shields any breach of these privileges in connection with
disclosure of money laundering from criminal or civil liability. 9 However, information
is not treated as privileged, and an attorney therefore has a duty to disdose any money
laundering activities if the client gives the information to his attorney with a view to
furthering criminal purposes, or if the information relates to criminal conduct. 30 Fur-
thermore, the know-your-customer requirements are strengthened because at no time
does the legal privilege "extend to information regarding the identity and address of the
client or principal." 3 This would seem to create a broad duty of disclosure even within
the attorney-client context because the duty of disclosure is created when the person
giving the information to an attorney possesses a criminal motive and is not dependent
upon either the attorney's knowledge or purpose for eliciting the information.
120. FATF, Review 2001, supra note 3, at 3, 1 1.
121. Id. at 7-8, 20.
122. Hetherington-Gore, supra note 112.
123. See MONEY LAUNDERING (PROCEEDS OF CRIME) Act, 1995, §9(1).
124. See Proceeds of Crime Act, No. 44 of 2000 (2000), §40(2) (Bah.).







2. International Business Companies Act, 2000
Introduced on December 29, 2000, the International Business Companies Act (IBC
Act) constituted "an essential step in strengthening the Know-Your-Customer regime in
The Bahamas, and towards full compliance with FATF recommendations" '32 Recom-
mendations 10 through 13 of the FATF's Forty Recommendations' 33 and criteria 4, 5,
6, 7, 13, and 14 of the Criteria defining non-cooperative countries'3 4 all identified the
customer identification problems raised by the existence of bearer shares and anonymous
accounts as detrimental to the fight against money laundering. 135 The IBC Act prohibits
the issuance of bearer shares, 3 6 requires that all bearer shares in issue be cancelled, and
that registered shares be issued as replacements. 137 This Act directly addressed the con-
cerns raised by the FATF in its 2000 Review regarding the ability of IBCs to issue bearer
shares.'M As a result, the FATF praised the Bahamas and cited the elimination of bearer
shares when it removed the Bahamas from the list of non-cooperative in 2001.119
3. Financial Transaction Reporting Act, 2000
The Financial Transaction Reporting Act implements a full know-your-customer
regime through the creation of three basic obligations on financial institutions in the
Bahamas. The Act requires financial institutions to take reasonable steps' 4° to verify the
identity of their customers when conducting transactions.14 ' This obligation addresses
the complaint raised by the FATF in its Review 2000 about the ability of some inter-
mediaries (for example, lawyers) to invoke professional codes of conduct to hide the
identities of their clients.'42 The Act also obligates financial institutions to report suspi-
cious transactions to the Bahamas' Financial Intelligence Unit.'
4 3
The third obligation created by the Act directly addressed the FATF's Recommenda-
tion 12 that financial institutions maintain transaction records for at least five years.'44
Financial institutions must now maintain records verifying the identity of their cus-
tomers"' for every transaction conducted through the financial institution'" for at least
five years. '4 7
132. Hetherington-Gore, supra note 112.
133. FATF, Recommendations, supra note 49, at 3-4, 11 10-13.
134. FATF, Report on Non-cooperative Countries, supra note 59, at 10-11, 11 4-7 & 13-14.
135. See FATF, Recommendations, supra note 49, at 3-4, 11 10-13; FATF, Report on Non-cooperative
Countries, supra note 59, at 3, t 13.
136. International Business Companies Act, No. 45 of 2000 (2000), §10(a) (Bah.).
137. Id. §195(4).
138. FATF, Review 2000, supra note 1, at 3, 1 12.139. FATF, Review 2001, supra note 3, at 8, $ 21.
140. Financial Transactions Reporting Act, No. 40 of 2000 (2000), §§11(1) & 13(1)(a) (Bah.).
141. See id. §§6-9.
142. FATF, Review 2000, supra note 1, at 3, 12. However, the act does not require the disclosure
of any privileged attorney-client communication, just disclosure of the identity of the client.
Financial Transactions Reporting Act, supra note 140, §17.
143. Financial Transactions Reporting Act, supra note 140, §14(1).
144. FATF, Recommendations, supra note 49, at 3-4, T 12.
145. Financial Transactions Reporting Act, supra note 140, §24(1).
146. Id. §23(1).
147. Id. §§23(3) & 24(4)(a)-(c).
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The first experiences with the act illustrate the worries the Bahamas faces as it adopts
regulations to comply with the FATF.' The act calls for written reports on many types
of financial transactions, and it has drawn complaints from the financial industry in the
Bahamas."" Transactions that previously occurred electronically within seconds can now
take days. 50 Wendy Warren, the CEO and Executive Director of the Bahamas Financial
Services Board, has said that the act is "a nightmare, and it causes business to come to
a halt:"'
The Bahamas is seeking to change the impact of the new requirements by amending
the act, 52 but must be careful that in doing so they do not risk again being labeled
non-cooperative. Though the FATF's Review 2000 did not cite the Bahamas' lack of
mandatory reporting requirements as a reason for being labeled non-cooperative,5 3 the
lack of mandatory reporting requirements was one of the reasons listed for finding the
Cayman Islands to be non-cooperative,' 54 and Bermuda was praised by the FATF for its
"efficient mandatory system" for reporting suspicious transactions.' Any changes that
appear to weaken the reporting requirement may be viewed as a non-cooperative act.
4. Financial Intelligence Unit Act
The twenty-fifth, and final, criterion used by the FATF for defining a non-cooperative
country is the "lack of [a] centralised unit (i.e., a financial intelligence unit). . . for the
collection, analysis and dissemination of suspicious transactions information to compe-
tent authorities:"5 The Financial Intelligence Unit Act directly addressed this require-
ment by creating a financial intelligence unit (FIU). s7 The FIU is to receive all disclosures
of information required under the Proceeds of Crime Act and to disseminate informa-
tion regarding the proceeds of offenses.' 8 Furthermore, .the FlU addresses the FATF's
observation that long delays, restricted responses to requests for assistance, and no room
for cooperation outside of judicial channels marked the process of international cooper-
ation in the Bahamas. 5 9 Carl Bethel, the Minister of Justice, commented that he believed
"that the Bahamas was blacklisted by the FATF mainly because of its reluctance to co-
operate with international investigations:"' As a result, the Financial Intelligence Unit
Act specifically provides for cooperation between the FIU of the Bahamas and foreign
FIUs.' 61





153. See FATF, Review 2000, supra note 1, at 2-3, 12-13.
154. Id. at 4, 21.
155. Id. at 3, 15.
156. FATF, Report on Non-cooperative Countries, supra note 59, at 6, 34.
157. Financial Intelligence Unit Act, No. 39 of 2000 (2000), §3(1) (Bah.).
158. Id. §4(1).
159. FATF, Review 2000, supra note 1, at 3, 1 12.
160. Hetherington-Gore, supra note 112.
161. Financial Intelligence Unit Act, supra note 157, §4(2)(a), (c), (g)-(h).
Fall 2002 655
The creation of the FIU further illustrates the danger the Bahamas and other off-
shore centers face as they undertake efforts to comply with the demands of the FATF
while at the same time they try to preserve their unique comparative advantages in
financial services. The FIU Act was designed to meet the standards of practice in use in
many jurisdictions. 162 Prime Minister Ingraham has said, "[wie are not asking banking
institutions in the Bahamas to operate under rules that they are unfamiliar with.""
Instead, the Bahamas is asking banks "to conduct business in the Bahamas as they would
in Zurich, or Toronto, or London, or New York." The question that faces the Bahamas
and its customers is: if business is conducted in the Bahamas as it is in Zurich, Toronto,
London, or New York, what reason is there for the business to be conducted in the
Bahamas rather than in any of these jurisdictions or in any of the other financial centers
of the industrialized world?
5. Central Bank of the Bahamas Act
The new central bank act further addresses the complaints by the FATF concerning
the "long delays and restricted responses to requests for assistance." 65 The Act expands
the powers of the Governor, provides for better supervision of financial institutions, and
allows for better cooperation between the central bank and overseas authorities.6 6 The
act defines the functions of the Central Bank of the Bahamas to include "the power to
assist and co-operate with overseas regulatory authorities."' 67
6. Bank and Trust Companies Regulation Act
This new act further strengthens the role of the Central Bank Governor. It provides
for greater supervisory powers of banks and trust companies.' 6 Furthermore, the act
provides for cross-border supervision of foreign banks with branches or subsidiaries
incorporated within the Bahamas by foreign regulatory authorities.
169
The Act maintains the general statutory duty of confidentiality for banks, 170 but
contains more exceptions to this duty than the previous act. The new act prohibits the
disclosure of information gained in the course of employment,' except in certain cases
including disclosures to persons in connection with criminal proceedings, 172 or for the
purpose of assisting the Governor of the Central Bank of the Bahamas in the performance
of his duties.' The influence of the FATF's Review 2000 is evident when one considers
that the previous version of the act contained neither of the two above exceptions to
162. See Hetherington-Gore, supra note 112.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. FATF, Review 2000, supra note 1, at 3, 1 12.
166. Hetherington-Gore, supra note 112.
167. Central Bank of the Bahamas Act, No. 37 of 2000 (2000), §5(2) (Bah.).
168. Hetherington-Gore, supra note 112.
169. Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, No. 38 of 2000 (2000), §10 (Bah.).
170. Id. §15(1).
171. See id. §15(1)(a)-(f).
172. Id. §15(1)(v)(a).
173. Id. §15(1)(iv).
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the statutory duty of confidentiality. 74 The Act also excepts the Inspector of Banks and
Trust Companies established under the Act 7 ' from the duty of confidentiality "where he
believes that a suspicious transaction was not reported as required under the Financial
Transactions Reporting Act, 2000."76
The new Act also increases the licensing criteria for banks and trust companies.
It provides that the Governor may grant a license after considering: the applicant's fit-
ness to conduct business,'7 7 the sufficiency of the applicant's financial resources,'7  "the
soundness and feasibility of the business plan" 79 the applicant's experience and busi-
ness record, 8° the character and competence of those who will operate the company,''
and "the best interests of the financial system in The Bahamas."182 Considering that the
previous version of the act did not mandate consideration of any specific factors when
determining whether to issue a license and that it provided that a license could be issued
so long as it was not against the public interest,"' this is a much wider mandate for
investigation into banks and trust companies that is concordant with the FATF's concern
about the potential use of shell corporations by money launderers.1
s4
7. Financial and Corporate Service Providers Act
"Only banks and trust companies licenced under the Banks & Trust Companies Reg-
ulations Act, and financial and corporate service providers licenced under the Financial
and Corporate Service Providers Act, may provide registration, management, administra-
tion, registered agent, registered office, nominee shareholders and officers and directors
for IBCs"... As both the Banks & Trust Companies Regulations Act and the Financial
and Corporate Service Providers Act require their licensees to comply with the Financial
Transaction Reporting Act 8 6 and provide beneficial ownership information, 87 the effect
is to require full application of the know-your-customer regime to IBCs.8 8 Again, this
shows an appreciation for the FATF's concerns about the abuse of shell corporations by
money launderers and the changes the Bahamas are willing to make to their laws to be
removed from the FATF's list of non-cooperating countries.
174. Id,, §lO(l)(e)(i)-(iii) (1965).








183. Id., §4(1) (1965).
184. Recommendation 25. FATF, Recommendations, supra note 49, at 5 25.
185. Hetherington-Gore, supra note 112. See also International Business Companies Act, supra
note 136, §4.
186. See Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, supra note 169, §§9(2)(b), 15(7)(c); Financial
and Corporate Service Providers Act, No. 41 of 2000 (2000), §12(3) (Bah.).
187. See Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, supra note 169, §15(5)-(6); Financial and
Corporate Service Providers Act, supra note 186, §14(1)(3).
188. Hetherington-Gore, supra note 112.
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While the changes outlined above justified removing the Bahamas from the list of
non-cooperative nations in 2001, the FATF listed areas within the Bahamas' financial
system that it would continue to monitor. In particular, the FATF noted that it would
monitor the amount of resources that the Bahamas devoted to the institutions created
in the previous year, the application of the new customer identification requirements
to accounts that pre-date the requirements, and the efforts made to ensure compliance
by the Bahamian financial sector with the improved anti-money laundering regime.'8 9
Furthermore, in accord with their stated concerns about obstacles to administrative
and judicial cooperation, 190 the FATF would continue in the following year to moni-
tor "the ability of the Bahamian regulators to access [suspicious transaction reporting]
information and cooperate with foreign counterparts, [and] the continued practice of
cooperating with judicial authorities." '
While the strength of the government's response to the FATF's blacklist preempted
an exodus of the island's bigger banks and strengthened the island's reputation as a
financial center,19 2 compliance with the demands of the FATF has not been without its
costs. Banks that remain in the Bahamas are facing higher regulatory costs because some
of the rules the Bahamas has adopted are stricter than international rules.' 93 The new
regulations create demands on the operations of banks in the Bahamas that cost the
banks financial and staff resources.
94
There have been few job losses, but some managed banks (with minimal physi-
cal presence in the Bahamas) have left because of the increased licensing requirements
adopted in response to the FATF's blacklist,19 5 and "the Bahamas is receiving fewer
applications to do banking business in the country."'" While the central bank governor
comments that tightening the regulations in the Bahamas "was something we had to
do" to others the "legislation appears to be much stronger than that enacted in any
other affected jurisdiction." 9' As a result, countries like the British Virgin Islands and
the Cayman Islands seem to be attracting clients that left the Bahamas.' 9 A loss of
clients to either of these two jurisdictions would perhaps indicate a real erosion of the
competitiveness of the Bahamas' financial sector. It would also indicate that the Bahamas
did go too far in responding to the FATF's demands because the British Virgin Islands
were not in either of the FATF's reviews and, like the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands was
able to win removal from the list of non-cooperative countries in the Review 2001. The
Bahamas has faced the choice between maintaining sovereign authority over regulations
and staying on the good side of the international financial community as represented by
189. FATF, Review 2001, supra note 3, at 8, 22.
190. FATF, Report on Non-cooperative Countries, supra note 59, at 4-5, 23-31.
191. FATF, Review 2001, supra note 3, at 8, 1 22.
192. Richard Lapper, Survey-Bahamas: Shock-proof Isles Must Face up to Change, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
19, 2001, available at 2001 WL 31429998.
193. Id.
194. Canute James, Survey-Bahamas: All Comes Clean with Laws on Laundering, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
19, 2001, available at 2001 WL 31429995.
195. Lapper, supra note 192.
196. James, supra note 194.
197. Id.
198, Id.
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the FATE It has chosen to escape the penalties of the FATF's blacklist by bowing to its
coercive powers.
8. The Bahamian Response to September 11th
Showing an understanding of the new state of affairs following the terrorist attacks
of September 11th, the Bahamas was one of the first countries to respond in the
wake of the terrorist attacks.'99 The Bahamas promulgated the International Obligations
(Afghanistan) Order 2001 in late September before the FATF adopted its new stan-
dards.2" The order prohibited "any person dealing with any property, and any financial
institution licensed in The Bahamas, from transacting business with Osama bin Laden,
the Al Qaeda organization, or any individuals associated with them."20'
9. The Bahamas in 2002
The Bahamas continued to make progress even following their removal from the
FATF's list of non-cooperative countries in 2001. The FATF's Review to Identify Non-
cooperative Countries or Territories issued June 21, 2002 (hereinafter Review 2002) cited
the Central Bank of the Bahamas for implementing an ambitious inspection program,
conducting 165 on-site examinations for the year up to March 31, 2002. It also cited
the Securities Commission for conducting inspections of seventy-eight licensees and
registrants since March 200122 In response to the new requirement that banks maintain
a physical presence in the Bahamas implemented to gain the acceptance of the FATF,
ninety-nine bank licenses were revoked between 2001 and May 2002.203 The Review 2002
indicated that the FATF would continue to monitor the Bahamas paying special attention
to its cooperation with the requests of foreign regulators."'
B. CAYMAN ISLANDS
The development of the Cayman Islands as an offshore financial center has met
with great success, and today the islands are the world's fifth most significant financial
center.20 5 The Cayman Islands also rank behind only the United States, United Kingdom,
Japan, and France in the volume of deposits placed through their banks.2" In fact, the
199. Statement by Wendy Warren, CEO and Executive Director of the Bahamas Financial Ser-
vices Board, at http://www.bfsb-bahamas.com/news-..print.lasso?id=33100 (last visited Mar.
10, 2002).
200. The FATF adopted its special recommendations on terrorist financing October 30, 2001 one
month after the Bahamas adopted their law. FATF, Crack Down, supra note 76, at 1.
201. Statement by Wendy Warren, supra note 199.
202. FATF, Review to Identify Non-cooperative Countries or Territories: Increasing the Worldwide
Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures 18 1 88 (June 21, 2002), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/NCCT2002-en.pdf [hereinafter FATF, Review 2002].
203. Id. 89.
204. Id. 90.
205. GILMORE, supra note 8, at 185.
206. GINSBERG, supra note 35, at 222.
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Cayman Islands' per capita income of $30,120 "makes the Caymans richer than Saudi
Arabia during the peak of the petroleum boom in the early 1980s:
207
In the FATF's Review 2000, the FATF acknowledged that "the Cayman Islands
has been a leader in developing anti-money laundering programmes throughout the
Caribbean:'2"8 The Cayman Islands previously served as president of the Caribbean
Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), provided assistance to the other states of the
Caribbean in anti-money laundering, closed financial institutions based on worries about
money laundering, and cooperated with other authorities in criminal law enforcement
matters. 209 Moreover, the Cayman Islands "uncovered several serious cases of fraud and
money laundering otherwise unknown to authorities in FATF member states:'
210
Despite the Cayman Islands obvious commitment to combating money launder-
ing, the FATF nevertheless still identified deficiencies within the Cayman Islands that
warranted their inclusion in the list of non-cooperative countries. The Cayman Islands
met fully thirteen of the twenty-five criteria, and partially satisfied a further four of
the twenty-five criteria.2 1' However, the Islands allowed funds to flow in and out of the
country with no restriction and had some of the strictest confidentiality laws in the
world.212
The FATF found fault with the lack of legal requirements for customer identification
and record keeping, and the inability of supervisory authorities to gain access to infor-
mation regarding the identity of customers.213 A large class of management companies
was unregulated, and the Cayman Islands did not have "a mandatory regime for the
reporting of suspicious transactions."
214
In the following year, the Cayman Islands made significant progress in implementing
its new anti-money laundering framework.215 The FATF praised the Cayman Islands for
increasing appreciably the resources allocated to financial supervision and to its FIU.
216
The Cayman Islands enacted laws addressing customer identification and record keeping
for financial services and laws creating sanctions for a failure to report suspicious trans-
actions.2 17 The FATF also praised the Cayman Islands for embarking upon an "ambi-
tious financial inspection programme:' for requiring the identification of all pre-existing
accounts, and for requiring all banks licensed in the Cayman Islands to establish a physi-
cal presence in the islands.218 Additionally, many of the rules that previously existed only
as guidelines within a code of practice are now legal requirements. 2 9
207. Tod Robberson, Offihore, Many a Tax Haven, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 3, 2002, at 33A.
208. FATF, Review 2000, supra note 1, at 4, 1 22.
209. Id. at 4, 22.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 4, 20.
212. GINSBERG, supra note 35, at 220.
213. FATF, Review 2000, supra note 1, at 4, 20.
214. Id. 21.
215. FATF, Review 2001, supra note 3, at 8, 25.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 8, 1 24.
218. Id. at 8, 25.
219. Cayman Islands: Working Paper Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., at 7, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.109/2001/15 (2001).
660 Law and Business Review of the Americas
Much like the rules adopted by the Bahamas, those adopted by the Cayman Islands
evidence the direct effect of the FATF's Forty Recommendations and twenty-five criteria
for defining non-cooperative nations. The Cayman Islands acknowledged as much by
stating that it "has framed its regulatory system around international standards of super-
vision and cooperation with overseas regulatory authorities in the fight against financial
crime"220
A money laundering offense in the Cayman Islands occurs when a person assists a
second person in retaining or controlling the proceeds of criminal conduct if the person
knows or suspects that the second person has engaged in or benefited from criminal
conduct.22" ' The new laws addressed the FATF's concern about the lack of "a mandatory
regime for the reporting of suspicious transactions"222 by making the failure to disclose
known or suspected money laundering a money laundering offense itself.223
The requirement to report knowledge or suspicion about money laundering activities
extends to the attorney-client relationship. The requirement to make a disclosure about
known or suspected money laundering includes knowledge or suspicion that comes to
a person "in the course of his trade, profession, business or employment.' 224 The duty
to make a disclosure is not relieved by normal client confidentiality standards because
"a report of a suspicious activity ... does not give rise to any civil liability to the client
or others and does not constitute, under Cayman Islands law, a breach of the duty of
confidentiality' 2 s
Tipping off the target of a money laundering investigation about an actual or pro-
posed investigation into possible money laundering offenses is itself an offense.226 While
tipping off carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison and an unlimited fine,
all other money laundering offenses couple the possibility of an unlimited fine with a
maximum of fourteen years imprisonment.22'
There are only two defenses to a money laundering charge. The first defense requires
the defendant to prove a lack of knowledge or suspicion that the transaction "related
to the proceeds of criminal conduct or that it facilitated the retention or control of the
proceeds by the criminal"2 28 The second defense to a money laundering charge is to
report the suspicious transaction. 229 If a report is made about a suspicion concerning
the source of the funds involved, it is not an offense to proceed to carry out the transac-
tion.23° The report must be made before or as soon as reasonably possible after carrying
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out the suspicious transaction."' If the report is made before the transaction, there is
no risk of prosecution in proceeding with the suspicious transaction before receiving the
consent of the authorities.2
32
The Cayman Islands also adopted regulations that seek to meet the know-your-
customer requirements reflected in the Forty Recommendations and twenty-five criteria.
Persons in the Cayman Islands should not form business relationships without estab-
lishing the identity of the person for whom they are conducting a transaction.233 The
regulations comply with the record keeping requirements of the twenty-five criteria by
mandating that records of a customer's identity and transactions be kept for a period of
at least five years. 23
Yet, as they adopted regulations more compliant with the FATF's requirements, the
Cayman Islands acknowledged the difficulty of their task. The laws and regulations that
they adopt to help them avoid the condemnation of the FATF must also allow the Islands
"to maintain their position as a premier jurisdiction, while at the same time ensuring
that its institutions can operate in a competitive manner.
" 231
As with the Bahamas, while removing the Cayman Islands from the list of non-
cooperative jurisdictions in its Review 2001, the FATF promised to continue to monitor
the Islands' progress "in applying customer identification requirements to pre-existing
accounts, and further efforts to enhance compliance by the financial sector with the
new anti-money laundering requirements' 236 Also of importance for the following year
would be the continued ability of the Caymanian authorities to cooperate with their
counterparts in money laundering investigations.
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The FATF's Review 2002 brought a special gift for the Cayman Islands from the
FATF. The FATF announced that the Cayman Islands had adequately addressed the iden-
tified deficiencies within their financial system and consequently would no longer require
monitoring by the FATF.23' However, the FATF said that the Cayman Islands should
continue to participate in the CFATF and its monitoring procedures.
239
C. DomINICA
In the FATF's Review 2000, Dominica was deemed to meet fourteen of the twenty-
five criteria defining a non-cooperative nation. 24 1 In labeling Dominica non-cooperative,
the FATF observed that some of Dominica's legislation was outdated, and that the
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offshore sector was largely unregulated.241 The report particularly cited obstacles to the
identification of owners of accounts. 42
Dominica was able to make some progress over the following year, but was not able
to match that of the Bahamas or the Cayman Islands and remained on the list of non-
cooperative jurisdictions.2 43 Dominica addressed some of the FATF's recommendations
by enacting laws that criminalized money laundering, established a financial intelligence
unit, and created some record keeping and suspicious transaction reporting require-
ments. 44 Dominica, however, still needed to address issues of customer identification,
retention of records for the FATF-mandated five years, and the ability of supervisory
authorities to access necessary information. 24
In the Review 2002, Dominica was again deemed a non-cooperative nation. 246
Regardless, Dominica gained plaudits from the FATF for amendments to the Offshore
Banking Act that require offshore banks to establish a physical presence in the jurisdic-
tion, and for amendments to the International Business Companies Act that create a
mechanism to register bearer shares.247 The ability for Dominica to aid foreign regula-
tory authorities was enhanced as of January 31, 2002, by the Exchange of Information
Act.248 Dominica also amended its International Exempt Trust Act to grant government
access to the financial documents of licensees under the Act.249 Although Dominica
made significant legislative and regulatory progress, the FATF continued to be concerned
about Dominica's ability to cooperate timely to requests for international mutual legal
assistance and the fact that there was no clear mechanism to direct cooperation with
regulators from foreign banks.2 "
D. ST. KITTS AND NEViS
Though St. Kitts and Nevis met twenty of the FATF's criteria, the FATF judged
them to be non-cooperative in its 2000 review of non-cooperative countries."' The FATF
identified numerous faults within the offshore sector of Nevis, the financial center of the
federation. 22 Money laundering was a crime only in the context of drug trafficking and
not when it involved the proceeds of other criminal acts.253 The offshore sector in Nevis
was largely unsupervised with no procedures to combat money laundering.5 4 There were
numerous obstacles to customer identification and to international cooperation.25 '
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St. Kitts and Nevis did not make enough progress in the following year to war-
rant their removal from the list of non-cooperative nations." 6 Though several laws
were enacted which established customer identification procedures, required maintaining
records, and required reporting suspicious transactions, there were still issues that needed
to be addressed before St. Kitts and Nevis could be deemed cooperative.257 Chief among
the remaining issues were the identification of the beneficial owners of accounts and the
ability of the authorities within St. Kitts and Nevis to cooperate internationally. 258
In 2002, St. Kitts and Nevis won removal from the FATF's list of non-cooperative
countries.259 The one change cited by the FATF for the removal of St. Kitts and Nevis was
the creation of a mechanism for the registration of bearer shares that includes identifying
the beneficial owners of accounts." This change certainly appears to be a direct response
to the FATF's blacklisting of St. Kitts and Nevis one year earlier. It directly addressed one
of the main issues cited by the FATF in 2001 for the inclusion of St. Kitts and Nevis on
its list of non-cooperative countries.261 Though the FATF did remove St. Kitts and Nevis
from its blacklist, it will continue to monitor the jurisdiction and pay special attention
both to cooperation between St. Kitts and Nevis and international regulatory authorities.
The FATF will also pay special attention to the development of and resources devoted to
the newly created FIU and other anti-money laundering entities.
2 62
E. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
St. Vincent and the Grenadines were fully in compliance with sixteen of the FATF's
twenty-five criteria and partially in compliance with one more in the FATF's Review
2000.263 The review provided a veritable laundry list of problems with the anti-money
laundering framework of the islands. First, there was a complete absence of anti-money
laundering regulations with respect to offshore institutions.2"4 No know-your-customer
or record keeping requirements existed, nor was there any positive obligation to report
suspicious transactions.265 The resources devoted to supervision were inadequate, and the
authorities were prohibited from cooperating with international jurisdictions in many
cases.
266
St. Vincent and the Grenadines made the least amount of progress of the five
Caribbean jurisdictions identified as non-cooperative in the FATF's Review 2000.67 They
did enact some laws creating authorization and registration requirements for banks in
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the offshore sector and allowed some access to otherwise confidential information.16
The FATF did observe, however, that as of June 2001 there had been no progress in
addressing the identified deficiencies since February 2001.'69 Clearly, the FATF intended
the process to be ongoing and did not envision a four-month respite in the fight against
money laundering.
Between the FATF's Review 2001 and Review 2002, St. Vincent and the Grenadines
enacted legislation to address the deficiencies in their anti-money laundering framework.
In December of 2001 and January of 2002, laws were enacted that criminalized launder-
ing the proceeds of any criminal conduct, required the reporting of suspicious transac-
tions, and mandated requirements for record-keeping.270 Nevertheless, St. Vincent and
the Grenadines remain on the FATF's list of non-cooperative nations.17 ' There are still
broad exemptions from requirements for customer identification, and the FATF remains
concerned about the ability of authorities to cooperate with regulators from foreign
banks. It "strongly encourages" St. Vincent and the Grenadines to address the issue.21
VI. Conclusion
The kind of encouragement by coercion represented by the FATF's list of non-
cooperative nations illustrates the choice that the nations of the Caribbean face. At
the beginning of September 2000, the likely course for the imposition of international
financial standards through the FATF was progress in fits and starts with the United States
supporting the resistance of offshore jurisdictions to some of the proposed standards.
The Bush Administration seemed skeptical about the value of multilateral institutions
such as the FATF.273 The traditional support of the United States for tax competition was
also likely to blunt any attempt by European nations to regulate the tax evading aspects
of the offshore financial centers found in the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Dominica,
St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
274
In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center Towers and the
Pentagon, the likely course of the fight against money laundering in the Caribbean is
both easier to chart and more perilous for offshore centers. The pressures placed on
the regulatory systems of the Caribbean nations to comply with international norms
represented by the FATF will increase. Where previous American support for the FATF
was nominal, the Bush Administration today fully supports the efforts of the FATF in
the fight against money laundering.
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The new urgency of the fight against money laundering provided by the September
attacks, coupled with the collapse of Enron, is providing an opportunity for some
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politicians to conflate the low (or no) tax aspects of offshore centers with the issue of
the money laundering aspects of offshore centers and place greater burdens on their
continued operation. The U.S. press has pointed out that "Congress is considering mea-
sures to pressure [offshore financial centers] ... arguing that they provide hassle-free
havens for drug traffickers, money launderers, terrorists and others who want to hide
their activities from U.S. authorities"276 Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts, one of sev-
eral legislators pressing for a clamp-down on offshore centers, argues that a "growing
number of unscrupulous corporations and individuals are utilizing tax havens in the
Caribbean and elsewhere to avoid ... paying taxes'1 77 For Sen. Kerry, "[tihe spread of
tax havens punishes those who play by the rules. The end result is higher taxes on ...
those who comply with the law" 278 Before the attacks of September 11 th, it would have
been easy to envision another senator, from say Texas, taking exception to a suggestion
from a Massachusetts politician that low taxes were a problem. Today, there is likely to
be less support for offshore centers from any American legislators because the low tax
aspects of offshore centers are now coupled with the concerns about money laundering
in the minds of many.
Questions about the niceties of sovereignty will likely be brushed aside or ignored
by the industrialized nations as they demand compliance in return for not ostracizing
the offshore financial havens from the mainstreams of global finance. The new reality
will require a delicate balancing act on the part of all financial centers wishing to combat
terrorist financing and maintain their status as financial havens. While the Bahamas
remains "wedded to the belief that law-abiding persons and entities have a right to
privacy and confidentiality with respect to conduct of their affairs:' a view probably
shared by other offshore financial centers in the Caribbean, authorities in Europe and
especially the United States may feel differently when the alternative provides an effective
weapon against terrorist organizations. 279
While nations must respond to the very real danger represented by the FATF black-
list, they must walk a fine line. Nations dependent on their financial services sectors
must satisfy the FATF while not being viewed as merely placating the institution and
at the same time serve the customers who chose the jurisdiction for its favorable reg-
ulatory environment. In complying, the offshore centers will have to work to maintain
their comparative advantage in the provision of financial services while at the same time
adopting many of the same regulations found in the industrialized nations. The Central
Bank Governor of the Bahamas, Julian Francis, observed that the impact of the sensitiv-
ity and mobility of financial services means "any significant development which disturbs
the ease of major institutions doing business from [a] jurisdiction ... could result in
the rapid relocation of business to other jurisdictions willing to accommodate them."280
The goal of the financial centers will be to enact compliant regulations without losing
business to other, less regulated jurisdictions that might be willing to risk international
pariah status.
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